Chapter 3 Philosophy

Chapter 3 Philosophy

1. Metaphysics: the case studies
i., death and the meaning of life, life as a temporal whole
ii., personal identity
iii., the concept of time
iv., physicalism, reductionism

2. Ethics, moral philosophy

moral dilemmas
i., Moral person, rights, human rights, Rawls
Are you immortalized? Never mind, you are still a moral person!The first generation of partially immortalized people will form a minority. Then questions will emerge about the social status of human beings under continuous regeneration treatment.

In current moral philosophy, there exists a received view of the moral person, which was worked out in John Rawls’s Theory of Justice. The moral person could only be the subject of rights and duties. It is a range property: a person is a moral person or not, there is not any hierarchical moral difference between moral persons. According to Rawls’s definition there are two necessary conditions of being a moral person: the person must have a capacity to form, pursue and revise a conception of the good and ii., be capable of having a sense of justice. Rawls, John: Theory of Justice, 1999.,p. 442. He defines goodness as rationality: if a man is capable of forming a rational plan of life, then „a persons’s good is the successful execution of a rational plan of life” Rawls, John: Theory of Justice, 1999., p. 380 The presupposition of this condition is lifetime perspective, taking the life of one person as a temporal whole. With the pimm thought experiment an argument could be formulated against this „plan of life” criterion of Rawls’s definiton of a moral person.
i., Because of the unforeseen duration of one‘s lifetime, one‘s unlimited lifespan, the person under treatment is not able to consider his/her life as a temporal whole, so per definitionem he/she cannot form a rational plan of life.
ii., Immortalized persons are moral persons. We could not think intuitively that they are not moral persons just because they are under treatment.

Conclusion: „the plan of life” necessary condition of being a moral person is too strict, and a weaker condition is needed.

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Can partial immortalization be permissible to those who can buy it?

In the last philosophical-political section of Pimm I tried to delineate how to protect the right for partial immortalization when the costspimmpermit of the treatment are extremely high. After it turned out that on the grounds of equal dignity it is hard to make the treatment impossible for those, who can afford it, the second question is: Can the continuous regeneration treatment called pimm be permissible to those who can buy it? The answer is yes, because the persons under treatment are moral persons, are not morally in a lower class. Being a moral person is a range property: a person is a moral person or not, there is not any hierarchical moral difference between moral persons. If the treatment would not be permitted to them, this would violate their right to self-determination, and their right to self-determination cannot be legitimately interfered with.

Considering the other 2 hypothetical cost stages of the treatment, when it is moderately expensive, and eventually cheap enough that the state can guarantee it for its citizens, our question about the permissibility do not rise at all, because during that 2 pimm will be an organic and decisive constituent of society.

Third question: could we justify the right for partial immortalization with instrumental premises?

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ii., The levels of morality: descriptive and normative morality
life as a temporal whole, temporal neutrality

3. Political philosophy
Justice between generations
Justice between age groups
The neutrality of the state

4. Philosophy of technology
the developmental stages of technology
the inevitability of technology
therapy and enhancement

5. Analytical anthropology


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